第一篇:
We develop a theory of the relation between biases in financial reporting and managers' incentives to issue timely voluntary disclosures. We find that firms with relatively more conservative accounting are less likely to make timely voluntary disclosures than firms with less conservative accounting. Therefore, price is more timely in reflecting the news of firms with less conservative accounting. Prior research has assumed that the timeliness by which news is impounded in price is uncorrelated with the nature of accounting earnings and has ascribed a concave earnings-return relation to the accounting system reporting bad news on a more timely basis than good news. In our theory, a concave relation is not necessarily attributable to a difference in the way the accounting system reports good vs. bad news. Rather, our prediction stems from how biases in mandatory financial reports determine which firms optimally choose to make voluntary preemptive disclosures and which do not. Hence, our theory provides an alternative explanation for the empirical findings and cautions against interpreting them as evidence that accounting is conservative. Finally, we identify means of empirically distinguishing between the alternative explanations.
第二篇:
We examine the future sales implications of product quality measures for 11 plants of a manufacturing group in a Fortune 500 firm. Our results indicate that both financial quality measures, such as external failure costs incurred due to product failures at customer sites, and nonfinancial quality measures, such as defect rates and on-time deliveries, are leading indicators of future sales. While changes in defects and on-time deliveries affect sales in the subsequent quarter, changes in external failure costs are negatively associated with sales two and three quarters hence. Corroborating popular claims about the importance of external failure costs, we find that a $1 increase in external failure costs is associated with a cumulative sales decrease of $26, or approximately $10.40 in lost profits.
第三篇:
In this study we examine whether banks owned by interstate multibank holding companies coordinate their security gains and losses to manage their tax, earnings, and capital management objectives. Specifically, we examine whether the realization of security gains and losses is related to the objectives of the individual bank, the consolidated group, or both. We find subsidiary banks manage their gain realizations not only to reduce their own state taxes, but also strategically to reduce their consolidated groups' tax expense. Specifically, members of consolidated banking groups shift gain recognition to lower-taxed group members and away from higher-taxed group members. In addition, we find evidence suggesting that banks realize security gains and losses to manage both their own and their groups' financial statement earnings.
|